A Vintage Conflict Uncorked: The 21st Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Fully-Ripened Fight Over Interstate Wine and Liquor Sales by Meltzer, Marc Aaron
A VINTAGE CONFLICT UNCORKED: THE 21 s AMENDMENT,
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND THE FULLY-RIPENED FIGHT
OVER INTERSTATE WINE AND LIQUOR SALES
Marc Aaron Melze
INTRODUCTION
In the seven decades since the United States sounded the death
knell of the "Noble Experiment"' by ratifying the Twenty-first
Amendment to the Constitution, Prohibition's legacy has remained
in statutes and on dockets across the nation. State statutes codifying
the powers believed to be granted to the states by the Amendment's
second clause, which has long been interpreted as carving a niche out
of the Commerce Clause for state regulation of alcohol, have repeat-
edly been challenged as unconstitutional by interested parties seek-
ing to unburden the interstate commerce of wine and liquor. A re-
cent spate of such cases has arisen largely due to increasing interest
in national wine sales over the Internet. These cases, which have
been winding their way through several judicial circuits over the last
several years, have created a legal conflict that the Supreme Court
must resolve. The Court has heeded the call to clarify the placement
of the line dividing permissible state regulation and unconstitutional
encroachment on interstate commerce, and it should narrowly con-
strue section two of the Twenty-first Amendment, as has been its
trend in recent years, to foster more vigorous interstate commerce, in
line with other industries in this age of e-commerce.
Prohibition, though instituted earlier by Congressional mandate,
was formally constitutionalized by the ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment on January 16, 1919. 2 From the beginning, Prohibition
was met with wide-scale noncompliance and fostered the develop-
ment of organized criminal enterprises, which satisfied the public's
. J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., 2002, Princeton Uni-
versity. Many thanks to Professor Kermit Roosevelt for his assistance, and to the entire board
and staff of the Journal of Constitutional Law. Thanks always to my family for their love and sup-
port.
' See Loretto Winery Ltd. v. Gazzara, 601 F. Supp. 850, 856 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("President
Herbert Hoover, who had some difficulty in deciding whether he was a Wet or a Dry, coined
this expression for National Prohibition.").
' U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
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call for intoxicating liquors.3 The states finally ended this "Noble Ex-
periment"4 on a national level with the ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment on December 5, 1933. The Amendment reads:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of
the United States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any state, territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been rati-
fied as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several
states, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date
of the submission hereof to the states by the Congress.
The second section of the Amendment is the focus of this Comment.
In the discussion that follows, this Comment will examine both the
text and context of the Amendment and its ratification.
The substance of this Comment discusses the conflict between
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, as seen above, and the
Commerce Clause, granting Congress the "power... [t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes." Since the Marshall Court's expansive inter-
pretation in Gibbons v. Ogden,7 the strength of the Commerce Clause
has gradually expanded and contracted depending in part on the• 8
proclivities of the sitting Court and other attendant circumstances.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have shown a trend toward shrink-
ing Congress's permissible sphere of Commerce Clause action, while
upholding the federal preemption aspect of the dormant Commerce
Clause. 9
3 See, e.g., JOHN D. HICKS, REPUBLICAN ASCENDANCY 178 (1960) (describing the lack of en-
forcement of Prohibition and the availability of alcohol to whomever was interested).
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (establishing that state laws may not collide "with an act of
Congress, and deprive a citizen of a right to which that act entitles him," regardless of whether
those laws were passed "in virtue of a concurrent power" or "a power to regulate their domestic
trade and police").
8 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 5-4 to 5-8, at 305-17 (2d ed.
1988) (describing the changing modes of Supreme Court review of Commerce Clause cases);
Joshua A. Klein, Note, Commerce Clause Questions After Morrison: Some Observations on the New
Formalism and the New Realism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 571, 574-76 (2002) (discussing the Supreme
Court's approach to Commerce Clause litigation from Gibbons v. Ogden to the present day).
' Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the federal civil
remedy aspect of the Violence Against Women Act as beyond the scope of Congress's com-
merce power), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 as exceeding the authority of Congress), with Amer. Ins. Ass'n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (striking down California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief
Act of 1999 as preempted by federal foreign policy power), and Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
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The conflict between the Commerce Clause and Section 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment is not new and has, in fact, been the subject
of occasional litigation since shortly after the ratification of the
Amendment.' Why then is there this renewed and widespread inter-
est in this debate? The development of the Internet into a worldwide
commercial medium over the last decade has changed people's ex-
pectations with respect to what they should be able to buy and from
where they should be able to buy it. The growth of Internet com-
merce continues to be precipitous, with experts predicting strong
growth for the immediate future." Furthermore, direct shipment of
wine from producer to consumer, skipping the retail middleman, has
increased over the same time period, and promises to continue its
growth.'2 However, state statutes forged under the power granted by
the Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment have stifled or halted
this growth. These are the statutes that recent and ongoing litigation
challenges and this litigation is the subject of this Comment.
This Comment consists of three parts. In Part I, I will provide a
history of the problem, with an eye towards the drafting and passage
of the Twenty-first Amendment and Supreme Court jurisprudence
from ratification through the mid-1990s and the development of the
dormant Commerce Clause. In Part II, I will survey the out-of-court
facets of this debate and then provide a comprehensive analysis of the
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (striking down a Massachusetts statute restricting trade with
"Burma").
'0 The first such case was State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936),
discussed below. See infra Part I.A.3.
" As one source reported:
The 200M Americans who now have web access are likely to spend more than $120 bil-
lion online this year. And that is only part of the story. E-commerce has not only grown
into a huge thing in its own right, it has done so in a way that will change every kind of
business, offline as well as online.
E-Commerce Takes Off, ECONOMIST, May 15, 2004, at 9. See, e.g., Bob Tedeschi, More Canadians
Than Americans Use the Internet, but They Do Far Less of Their Shopping There, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2004, at C5 ("Patti Freeman Evans, an analyst with Jupiter Research, an online consulting firm,
released a report last week predicting that annual Internet retail spending would nearly double
in the United States from now to 2008, reaching $117 billion from a projected $65 billion this
year."); Nick Wingfield, Internet 2.0: E-tailing Comes of Age, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2003, at B1
("Consumers are expected to spend $12.2 billion online this year in the Thanksgiving-to-
Christmas period, up 42% from last year, according to Forrester Research of Cambridge, Mass.
The growth reflects a steady shift of retail spending to the online world, as consumers grow
more comfortable with the Internet. ").
2 E-Commerce: The Case of Online Wine Sales and Direct Shipment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 13
(2003) (statement of Todd Zywicki, Director, Office of Policy Planning, Federal Trade Commis-
sion) ("From 1994-99, consumers doubled the amount of money they spent having wine
shipped directly to them to around $500 million, or about 3% of the total spent on wine. Ac-
cording to some private estimates, online wine sales could account for 5-10% of the market
within a few years.") (summarizing Alix M. Freedman & John R. Emshwiller, Vintage System: Big
Liquor Wholesaler Finds Change Stalking Its Very Private Worl" WALL ST.J., Oct. 4, 1999, at Al).
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relevant recent and ongoing litigation, identifying issues that the Su-
preme Court needs to resolve when it hears these cases this term. In
Part III, I will propose an approach for the Supreme Court to take in
resolving these issues. I also propose a model state law, which will re-
tain state power as envisioned by the Twenty-first Amendment, but
allow for greater free trade of alcohol.
I. A HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
A. Rise and Fall and Rise of Prohibition
Under the lens of seventy years' worth of retrospection, Prohibi-
tion appears to be the legal and political odd-man-out.13 In the his-
tory of the republic the arduous mechanism of constitutional
amendment had never been used to address matters as mundane as
the manufacturing and sale of a single class of products until the pas-
sage and ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment. A quick glance
at the seventeen amendments preceding Prohibition shows that they
concern the structure of government and other issues of fundamen-
tal rights, such as the various freedoms and protections of the Bill of
Rights and the post-Civil War amendments.
1 4
1. Prohibition: Before and During
Proponents of Prohibition 5 were not sated by the string of federal
statutes enacted to empower the states to handle the issue of alcohol
importation on their own, many of which were struck down by the
Supreme Court. Starting in 1890 with the Wilson Act, 16 Congress
" See, e.g., Michael D. Schaffer, For Constitution, Change Does Not Come So Easily, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 25, 2004, at All ("Although constitutional amendments have had profound so-
cial implications, only once has an amendment taken aim at a specific social issue . . .. 'The
United States has experimented with social legislation in the Constitution only one time, with
Prohibition, and that was widely considered a failure.'") (quoting University of Pennsylvania
Professor of Law Nathaniel Persily); John Yoo, Let States Decide, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2004, at A8
(comparing the majority of existing amendments whose purpose is to ensure "equal and fair
treatment by the government" with the "most notable effort to regulate purely private con-
duct-the 18th Amendment's establishment of Prohibition" that "failed miserably and led to
the rise of organized crime.").
'4 See U.S. CONST. amends. I-XVII.
See ANN-MARIE E. SZYMANSKI, PATHWAYS TO PROHIBITION 23-64 (2003) (discussing the or-
ganizational approach of the anti-liquor movement from the late 1800s up to Prohibition, in-
cluding the Prohibition Party, Anti-Saloon League, and the Women's Christian Temperance
Union, among others).
16 The Act reads:
All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any
State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein,
shall upon arrival in such State or Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the
laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same
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granted to the states broadening regulatory powers to restrict the im-
portation of alcoholic beverages that would have otherwise violated
the "dormant" powers of the Commerce Clause. 17 Despite Congress's
expressed intent to empower the states, the Court continued to re-
strict the powers granted to the states in this area, leading to Con-
gress's passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, which contained lan-
guage similar to the eventual Section 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment:
The shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means whatso-
ever, of any.., intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one State... into
any other State... or from any foreign country into any State... which
said ... intoxicating liquor is intended, by any person interested therein,
to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used.., in violation of
any law of such State... is hereby prohibited.
This Act was upheld by the Court in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
Maryland Railway Co.,' just two years before the Eighteenth Amend-
ment decisively nationalized Prohibition.
The constitutionalization of national Prohibition is something of
an enigma in American legal and political history. Some see the pas-
sage and ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment as one result of
the confluence of a broadenini sense of national regulatory power
and the desperation of wartime. Whatever the driving reasons for its
passage, the Eighteenth Amendment ran into numerous enforce-. • 21
ment problems from its inception. It was only slightly more difficult
extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in
such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being intro-
duced therein in original packages or otherwise.
Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890). The passage of the Wilson Act was Congress's response
to Leisy v. Hardin, where the Court held that:
The absence of any law of Congress on the subject is equivalent to its declaration that
commerce in that matter shall be free. Thus the absence of regulations as to interstate
commerce with reference to any particular subject is taken as a declaration that the im-
portation of that article into the States shall be unrestricted.
135 U.S. 100, 119 (1890).
17 See Abigail B. Pancoast, Comment, A Test Case for Re-Evaluation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause: The Maine Rx Program, 4 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 184, 191-92 (2001) ("[I]n areas of interstate
commerce that Congress has not expressly regulated, states may not impose laws that facially
discriminate against interstate commerce, nor may they impose laws that excessively burden
interstate commerce even if they do not facially discriminate."); see also discussion infra Part I.B
(describing the development of the dormant Commerce Clause).
27 U.S.C. § 122 (2002).
" 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (holding that Congress, when acting within its powers, may grant
power to the states to act in areas otherwise precluded by the federal commerce power).
o See, e.g., HICKS, supra note 3, at 177 ("To a very considerable extent the Eighteenth
Amendment was a wartime legacy. It was submitted early in the war when the expansion of na-
tional powers was at its peak.").
2 See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 22 (1931) ("The Census Bu-
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to buy liquor under Prohibition than it had been prior to its passage,
and many people considered it righteous or fashionable to stand up
to this expansion of legal authority.
2 2
While the benefit of hindsight has accorded us a view of Prohibi-
tion as a momentary lapse of reason or a temporary overreaction to
the outcry of a particular social or political group, observers at the
time saw Prohibition and its tenacious supporters as an undefeatable
force and permanent reality of American law and politics. 2 3 Clearly,
this latter view proved false and the trend towards repeal picked up
steam toward the end of the 1920s.
2. Rolling Towards Repeal
No matter how many people or organizations favored the idea of
Prohibition before the Eighteenth Amendment and during the
dozen years of its enforcement,4 its implementation was universally
acknowledged as a failure.2 5 This failed extension of federal authority
was recognized in the 1932 election, when both parties' platforms
called for repeal.26 The Senate quickly went to work to effectuate this
mandate, and the Judiciary Committee reported the joint resolution
that developed into the Twenty-first Amendment within the first two
reau figures for the year 1929... indicate that after a brief period in the first years of the
amendment there has been a steady increase in drinking.").
P" See HICKS, supra note 3, at 178 ("People who wished to drink had no notion of being de-
prived of their liquor... ; indeed, it became the smart thing to drink, and many who had been
temperate in their habits before were now moved to imbibe freely as a protest against the legal
invasion of their 'personal liberty.'").
" See, e.g., DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 53-70 (2000) ("The Eight-
eenth Amendment appeared as impregnable as a medieval stone fortress to a band of ill-
equipped foot soldiers, and complaining about its constitutional deficiencies seemed about as
effective as kicking the base of the fortress wall."); HOWARD LEE McBAIN, PROHIBITION LEGAL
AND ILLEGAL 17 (1928) ("Political prophecies are perilous; but it is highly improbable that the
eighteenth amendment will ever be ripped from the side of the constitution or even be substan-
tially altered by the constitutionally prescribed method of amendment.").
21 See EDwARD BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 147-60 (1996)
(illustrating the arguments employed by Prohibition's supporters during the 1920s); KYVIG, su-
pra note 23, at 53-70 (describing the strength of the anti-repeal forces in the late 1920s).
21 See Sidney J. Spaeth, The Twenty-first Amendment and State Control Over Intoxicating Liquor:
Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV. 161, 176-80 (1991) ("Federal efforts at regulat-
ing alcoholic beverages failed during Prohibition. Even when federal efforts were focused on a
particular concern ... the problem persisted." ).
" See Brannon P. Denning, Smokey and the Bandit in Cyberspace: The Dormant Commerce Clause,
the Twenty-first Amendment, and State Regulation of Internet Alcohol Sales, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 297,
303 (2002) (describing the political situation regarding Prohibition in 1932).
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months of the term.2 7 The proposed amendment initially consisted of
four sections.2 s
Section 2 of Senate Joint Resolution 21129 became Section 2 of the
Amendment, and its sponsors saw it as a way to preserve the state au-
thority over alcohol regulation found in the Webb-Kenyon Act. The
third section proved the most controversial, calling for concurrent
federal power intended to prevent the reappearance of the saloon. °
Recorded Senate debates reveal strong opposition to section 3 based
on fears of congressional encroachment on state authority. 3' These
objections led the Senate to remove section 3, allowing the Senate to
pass the resolution. Despite the usually slow-moving amendment
process, the Twenty-first Amendment was ratified by thirty-six of the
forty-eight states before the end of 1933.32
Different perspectives emerged regarding the purpose of the
Amendment. Some scholars have described the two leading views as
the "federalist" and "absolutist" perspectives.33 The clash between
these interpretations is at the core of the current debate, even if nei-
ther interpretation has been fully embraced. Put succinctly,
27 Id. at 303-07 (recounting the Senate debate on sections 2 and 3 of Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 211).
2 S.J. Res. 211, 72d Cong. 2d Sess., 76 CONG. REC. 4138, 4139 (1933). The original proposal
read:
Sec. 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is
hereby repealed.
Sec. 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of
the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 3. Congress shall have concurrent power to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors to be drunk on the premises where sold.
Sec. 4. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amend-
ment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in
the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to
the States by the Congress.
Id.
Id.
o See Denning, supra note 26, at 303 ("[Resolution] 211 [section 3] ... allowed for concur-
rent federal power 'to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor to be drunk on the
premises where sold'-a provision squarely aimed at ensuring that, no matter what, the Nation
would be spared the return of the dreaded 'saloon.'"); Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitu-
tional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State
Regulation of Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1632-35 (2000) (re-
counting the congressional history of S.J. Res. 211).
1 Id.
32 U.S. Gov't Printing Office, The Constitution of the United States of America: Text of the
Amendments, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/html/conamt.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2004).
31 See Spaeth, supra note 25, at 180-83 (crediting the use of these terms to Michael E. Loo-
mis, Note, Federal District Court Exempts Interstate Rail Carrier from State Open Saloon Prohibition, 6
CREIGHTON L. REv. 249, 252-53 (1972)).
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[t]he "federalist" view was that section two merely protected dry states:
that is, states that allowed the importation, manufacture, or sale of in-
toxicating liquor gained no new powers vis-a-vis the federal government
under the amendment. The "absolutists" believed that the section gave
states plenary power to regulate the evils associated with intoxicating
beverages.
Recent court decisions have been split as to whether to look to the
context of the Amendment and its passage or simply to apply the text
itself. In deciding whether or not to invalidate state alcohol statutes,
courts have examined the "core concerns" of the Amendment-for
example, promoting temperance-in seeking to determine whether
the statute in question addresses those concerns narrowly or is
impermissibly broad 5
3. The Early Trend of Interpretation: Total State Control
Before discussing the recent cases in this area, I will survey the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the scope of the Twenty-first
Amendment beginning shortly after ratification and proceeding up
through the mid-1990s. While some of these cases differ factually and
circumstantially from the current field of Twenty-first Amendment
cases, they give context and contour to the legal landscape upon
which the current cases are being litigated.
In the first instance of interpretation, a mere three years after rati-
fication, the Supreme Court sided strongly with the states' rights to
regulate the importation of liquor, acknowledging that "[p]rior to
the Twenty-first Amendment it would obviously have been unconsti-
tutional to have imposed any fee for [the] privilege [of importing
beer] .,,6 In State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., the plain-
tiffs, "domestic corporations and individual citizens of California,"
sued to enjoin the state from enforcing a $500 importer's license fee,
claiming that the fee violated both the Commerce Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 7 The Court
found both arguments unconvincing and ruled for the defendants,
but not before giving some definition to the bounds of the Twenty-
first Amendment.
Id. at 181.
35 See, e.g., Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir. 2002) ("But if the State
demonstrates that its statutory scheme is closely related to a core concern of the Twenty-first
Amendment and not a pretext for mere protectionism, Florida's statutes can be upheld.").
State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).
.7 Id. at 60-61. The Court rejected the discrimination prong of the Commerce Clause ar-
gument, finding that the Commerce Clause analysis rested not on disparate treatment between
in-state and out-of-state corporations or individuals, but rather on the effect that any licensing
scheme had on interstate commerce. Id. at 62.
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The extent of permissible state power under the Amendment be-
comes clear from Justice Brandeis's rejection of plaintiffs argument:
"The amendment... abrogated the right to import free, so far as
concerns intoxicating liquors. The words used are apt to confer
upon the state the power to forbid all importations which do not
comply with the conditions which it prescribes."'38 Brandeis goes on
to comment that the plaintiffs' request that the Court require equal
treatment of in-state manufacturers and sellers and out-of-state im-
porters, "would involve not a construction of the amendment, but a
rewriting of it. '39  The Court's opinion, as expressed by Justice
Brandeis, was that Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment rendered
inactive with respect to alcohol the Commerce Clause's proscription
of discriminatory treatment between in-state and out-of-state parties.
Young's Market established the framework for early Supreme Court
interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment and the foundation for
these initial expressions of state plenary power. ° In Mahoney v. Joseph
Triner Corp., the Court ruled that states had a wide sphere of permis-
sible action to regulate liquor traffic under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment.4' The decision upheld a Minnesota statute which the plaintiff
corporation alleged violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because it required that brands of imported liq-
uor containing more than twenty-five percent alcohol must be regis-
tered with the Patent Office.42  The Court, in line with its Young's
Market framework, agreed with the defendant state officials who ar-
gued that, "since the adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment, the
equal protection clause is not applicable to imported intoxicating
liquor. 43 These decisions echo the above-mentioned congressional
discussion about preserving and strengthening state control over al-
cohol regulation.
In a pair of decisions handed down on the same day, the Supreme
Court took a strong stance on the question as to whether the Twenty-
first Amendment is in conflict with or wholly supercedes the Com-
merce Clause in the area of policing the liquor trade. 44 Indianapolis
m Id.
39 Id.
0 Justice Brandeis authored a number of these opinions that protect a large sphere of state
regulatory authority with respect to alcohol. SeeJoseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S.
395 (1939) (holding that states' rights to regulate the importation of intoxicating liquors are
not limited by the Commerce Clause); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n,
305 U.S. 391 (1939) (same); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938) (holding
that "the Equal Protection Clause is not applicable to imported intoxicating liquor").
4' 304 U.S. at 403.
Id. at 402-03.
Id. at 403.
See Finch & Co., 305 U.S. 395; Indianapolis Brewing Co., 305 U.S. 391.
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Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission4 5 challenged, on Commerce
Clause and Equal Protection Clause grounds, the Michigan Liquor
Control Act, which prohibited Michigan dealers from selling beer
manufactured in any state, which by its law, discriminated against
Michigan beer. Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick6 challenged a simi-
lar Missouri statute on these same grounds. Citing Young's Market and
Mahoney, the Court stated clearly in both opinions, in effectively iden-
tical passages, that "[s] ince the Twenty-first Amendment .... the right
of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liq-
uor is not limited by the Commerce Clause."
4 7
In an equally strong opinion later that year, the Court affirmed
the application of a Kentucky statute prohibiting a contract carrier
from transporting whiskey from Kentucky distillers to Chicago pur-
chasers without a license and held that denial of such a license was
not contrary to the Commerce, Due Process, or Equal Protection
Clauses of the Constitution. In disposing of this matter concisely,
the Court reiterated its rule that "although regulation by the state
might impose some burden on interstate commerce this was permis-
sible when 'an inseparable incident of the exercise of a legislative au-
thority, which, under the Constitution, has been left to the states."' 49
In the Court's eyes, the Twenty-first Amendment created such a situa-
tion.
These five cases marked a clear pronouncement of the Court's
initial approach toward interpreting the Twenty-first Amendment;
namely, that the states had and would have broad license to regulate
liquor traffic.
4. Chipping Away at State Control
Despite these broad pronouncements of the totality of state au-
thority, the Court did slowly recognize areas where the powers
granted by the Twenty-first Amendment had to be curtailed. In the
midst of early interpretations of the Amendment, the Court decided
Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co.,50 holding that state authority did
not apply in areas under the jurisdiction of the federal government,
:5 305 U.S. 391.
,6 305 U.S. 395. This was actually a combined decision, addressing four other suits against
McKittrick, attorney general of Missouri. The other plaintiffs were Ben Burk, Joseph E. Sea-
gram & Sons, Hinrichs Distilled Products, and Arrow Distilleries.
47 Indianapolis Brewing Co., 305 U.S. at 394.
4' Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
41 Id. at 141 (quoting S.C. Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)).
304 U.S. 518 (1938).
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such as parks 5' and federal military reservations, 2 even when these ar-
eas were within the territorial borders of that state.
In Collins, California attempted to apply its Beverage Control Act
to a corporation operating hotels, camps, and stores within Yosemite
National Park. The park had been ceded to the federal government
in 1919, with the state reserving "the right to tax persons and corpo-
rations, their franchises and property on the lands included in said
parks.,5 3 The Court held that in the absence of a specific contract re-
serving such rights, "such regulatory provisions as are found in the
California Beverage Control Act are unenforceable in the Park."54 In
so concluding, the Court clearly stated, "[w]here exclusive jurisdic-
tion is in the United States, without power in the State to regulate al-
coholic beverages, the XXI Amendment is not applicable., 55 This was
the first statement of the Court in any way limiting the scope of state
authority granted by the Twenty-first Amendment.
Though not constituting direct assaults on state power arising
from the Amendment, Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau5 6 and United States
v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc. 7 established that the federal government is
not without the authority to regulate interstate commerce in liquor,
thus allowing these Sherman Act prosecutions to stand.5s One year
after Frankfort Distilleries, this concept was reiterated in a footnote of
an opinion where the Court noted that "even the commerce in in-
toxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-first Amendment gives the
5' Id. at 530.
52 SeeJohnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944) (ordering the State of Okla-
homa to return 225 cases of wine it had confiscated that were destined for a federal military
reservation).
5' 304 U.S. at 525 (quoting 1919 Cal. Stat. 51).
Id. at 530.
Id. at 538.
307 U.S. 171 (1939).
17 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
In Frankfort Distilleries, the Court stated:
[g]ranting the state's full authority to determine the conditions upon which liquor can
come into its territory and what will be done with it after it gets there, it does not follow
from that fact that the United States is wholly without power to regulate the conduct of
those who engage in interstate trade outside the jurisdiction of [a particular state].
Id. at 299. The Court had previously recognized the co-existence of some congressional author-
ity with the state power granted by the Amendment to regulate interstate commerce in alco-
holic beverage:
[T]he Federal Alcohol Administration Act was attacked upon the ground that the
Twenty-first Amendment to the Federal Constitution gives to the States complete and
exclusive control over commerce in intoxicating liquors, unlimited by the Commerce
Clause, and hence that Congress has no longer authority to control the importation of
these commodities into the United States. We see no substance in this contention.
Jameson & Co., 307 U.S. at 172-73.
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States the highest degree of control, is not altogether beyond the
reach of the federal commerce power.
' '
5
9
5. The Tide Begins to Turn Against the Twentyfirst
After nearly two decades of dormancy, the Court repeated, in a
pair of same-day decisions written by Justice Stewart, the principle it
had articulated in Collins there exist both geographical and substan-
tive legal areas where states cannot exercise their Twenty-first
Amendment powers. 60 The first of these cases, Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp.,6 ' addressed New York's attempt to prevent duty-
free liquor sales in John F. Kennedy International Airport, where the
products sold were transported directly out of the country under the
supervision of the United States Bureau of Customs. Analogizing to
Collins, the Court held that New York may not "prevent completely
the transportation of liquor across [its] territory for delivery and use
in a federal enclave within it."'62 Hostetter represents the first judicial
invalidation of a state alcohol regulation since the years leading up to
Prohibition.
In his dissent, Justice Black argues that the Twenty-first Amend-
ment saves the New York statute from the type of federal conflict
which causes the majority to invalidate it. Black goes on to give a
brief history of the above-mentioned Senate debates, concluding that
"[t] he invalidation of New York's regulation.., makes inroads upon
the powers given the States by the Twenty-first Amendment. Ironi-
cally, it was against just this kind of judicial encroachment that Sena-
tors were complaining when they agreed to [Senate Joint Resolution]
211 and paved the way for the Amendment's adoption.,
64
In the next breath after Hostetter, the Court invalidated the appli-
cation of a Kentucky tax levied against a foreign whisky importer. In
contrast to the current docket of cases on this issue which rely on the
Commerce Clause, Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co.
rested on the Court's ruling that the Twenty-first Amendment did not
abrogate the Constitution's absolute ban on "imposts or duties on
59 Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 425 n.15 (1946) (invalidating a municipal or-
dinance requiring solicitors to pay license fee because of the likelihood of exclusion or dis-
crimination against interstate commerce, in favor of local businesses).
0 For a strong criticism ofJustice Stewart's opinions in these cases, see Denning, supra note
26, at 316-24.
6' 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
12 Id. at 333.
63 Id. at 335 (BlackJ., dissenting).
Id. at 340.
65 Dep't of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 346 (1964) (affirming the
Kentucky court's holding that Kentucky's tax was impermissible).
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imports or exports 6 found in the Export-Import Clause.67 The Court
distinguished the Export-Import Clause from the Commerce Clause
on the grounds that the power vested in the Commerce Clause is
generalized, while the Export-Import Clause contains a specific, flat
prohibition.
While neither Hostetter nor Beam Distilling Co. provide clear an-
swers for the questions raised in the ongoing Twenty-first Amend-
ment litigation, they stand as a collective turning point in judicial
thinking about the Amendment. Looking beyond these cases, there
is no longer the presumption of the Amendment's omnipotence in
the face of other constitutional or federal law that existed after
Young's Market and the other late 1930s cases.
6. State Power Continues to Shrink
In the tradition of Hostetter and Beam Distilling Co., a series of cases
in the 197 0s and early 1980s further tore down the presumption that
state alcohol statutes were invulnerable to conflicts with federal law.
In 1971, the Court struck down a Wisconsin statute allowing a range
of local officials to post public notices declaring that a given individ-
ual, who, by excessive drinking, has "expose [d] himself or family to
want" or endangered himself or the public, is prohibited from buying
or receiving gifts of liquor. 8 After noting that the Twenty-first
Amendment gives broad authority to the states, the Court held that
this labeling statute violated procedural due process and that the
Twenty-first Amendment did not save that statute.
A few years later, the Court held that state statutes enacted under
the broad powers of the Twenty-first Amendment could not survive a
collision with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Oklahoma had enacted a statute prohibiting the sale of low-alcohol
beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to women under the
age of eighteen. The Court was very clear in its ruling that "[the]
Twenty-first Amendment does not save the invidious gender-based
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. The clause reads in relevant part:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Im-
ports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection
Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Ex-
ports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be
subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.
Id.
7 377 U.S. at 343 ("The tax here in question is clearly of a kind prohibited by the Export-
Import Clause").
Id. at 344.
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 434 n.2 (1971).
70 Id. at 436.
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discrimination from invalidation as a denial of equal protection of
the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."
7'
The Court's discussion of the scope of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment is particularly interesting, given the current litigation and de-
bate:
[T]he Amendment primarily created an exception to the normal opera-
tion of the Commerce Clause. Even here, however, the Twenty-first
Amendment does not pro tanto repeal the Commerce Clause, but merely
requires that each provision "be considered in the light of the other, and
in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case."72
This is the type of language that those in favor of minimal state regu-
lation would have cheered at the time, but they were soon to receive
stronger precedential tools.
In another Sherman Act case, the Court further diluted the
strength of state statutes when coming in conflict with federal
power.73 In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., the Court's pronouncements that "there is no bright line be-
tween federal and state powers over liquor, 74 and that "[state] con-
trols may be subject to the federal commerce power in appropriate
situations... [which] can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of
those concerns in a 'concrete case, '' 75 bolstered the trend of the Su-
preme Court's Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence towards limit-
ing state power in this area, which had started in the mid-1960s. This
ruling would be supported in a later antitrust case, further challeng-
ing the imperviousness of state alcohol regulations. This trend was
in clear contradiction to those Supreme Court rulings that came
shortly after ratification of the Amendment 77 and this trend would
continue.
If Midcal blurred the line between federal and state authority over
alcohol regulation, then Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dial8 simply erased
and redrew it, shrinking the state sphere of action. The plaintiffs in
Bacchus challenged the constitutionality of Hawaii's liquor tax, which
called for a twenty percent excise tax imposed on sales of liquor at
71 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-05 (1976).
Id. at 206 (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332
(1964)).
" Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
7" Id. at 110.
'5 Id. (quoting Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332).
76 See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987) (applying the Midcal standard to in-
validate a New York liquor pricing system as violating § 1 of the Sherman Act).
See Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938) ("[S]ince the adoption of
the Twenty-first Amendment, the equal protection clause is not applicable to imported intoxi-
cating liquor."); State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936) ("The
Amendment... abrogated the right to import free, so far as concerns intoxicating liquors.").
78 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
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wholesale, and the exemption scheme for specific locally produced
alcoholic beverages.79 Finding that the Hawaiian legislature enacted
the tax exemptions for the purpose of "aid[ing] Hawaiian industry,"80
and thus that the exemptions constituted mere economic protection-
ism with a discriminatory purpose, the Court delved into its assault on
the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment.
Acknowledging and then dismissing the "broad language"8' of
early cases such as Young's Market and Joseph Triner Corp., the Court
looked to the more modern interpretations found in Midcal and
Hostetter to couch its reading of the Twenty-first Amendment. Setting
the stage for current Commerce Clause challenges to state alcohol
laws, the Bacchus Court stated plainly, but dramatically, that "[i] t is by
now clear that the Amendment did not entirely remove state regula-
tion of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of the Commerce
Clause.8 12 After quoting Hostetter and citing Midcal, the Court articu-
lated the proper standard as a balancing test to determine "whether
the principles underlying the Twenty-first Amendment are suffi-
ciently implicated by the [laws in question] to outweigh the Com-
merce Clause principles that would otherwise be offended. '8 . The
Court examined Hawaii's taxing scheme under this test and found it
constitutionally lacking.
Justice White, writing for the majority, delivered this forward-
looking pronouncement on the true meaning of both the Amend-
ment and the Commerce Clause:
[O]ne thing is certain: The central purpose of the provision was not to
empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to
competition. It is also beyond doubt that the Commerce Clause itself fur-
thers strong federal interests in preventing economic Balkanization. State
laws that constitute mere economic protectionism are therefore not enti-
tled to the same deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils
of an unrestricted traffic in liquor.84
Bacchus stands as the last major Supreme Court ruling on this issue
and it is under the shadow of Bacchus that the present litigation has
run its course thus far. 5
" Id. at 265. It is interesting to note that Frank H. Easterbrook, now a federal Court of Ap-
peals judge for the Seventh Circuit and the author of one of the recent opinions on this issue,
Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000), argued plaintiffs' case.
468 U.S. at 271.
Id. at 274.
:2 Id. at 275.
d.
:4 Id. at 276 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
' Bacchus has been cited thirty-two times by the Supreme Court, but none of these subse-
quent cases modifies the law or interpretation of this area of law to the extent that Bacchus did.
In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, the Court reiter-
ated the narrow ambit of state power following Bacchus.
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B. The Creation and Development of the Dormant Commerce Clause
As noted above, the origins of the dormant Commerce Clause are
traced back to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.86
In Gibbons, a steamboat operator sought to enjoin a competing
steamboat operator from navigating between New York and New Jer-
sey on the basis of a grant by the New York legislature of exclusive
navigation rights. Rather than directly speaking to the issue of
whether the states may act in ways that affect interstate commerce in
areas where Congress has not spoken, the Chief Justice "flirted with
the concept," as Professor Redish put it.8 Marshall did, however, lay
the foundation for the delineation between the state and federal
spheres of power: "when a State proceeds to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the very
power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which
Congress is authorized to do."
Marshall built on this foundation five years later in Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co.8° Willson involved a challenge to Delaware's au-
thorization of the construction of a dam across a navigable creek.
The Court rejected the challenge, but the Chief Justice used the term
"dormant" in the Commerce Clause context, setting up the develop-
ment of the doctrine in later years:
We do not think that the act empowering the Black Bird Creek Marsh
Company to place a dam across the creek, can, under all the circum-
stances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate
commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed
on the subject. °"
While neither Gibbons nor Willson illustrated that the Court antici-
pated the expansive development of the dormant Commerce Clause
in later years, they serve as early markers of the direction that the
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, however, speaks only to state regulation of the
.transportation or importation into any State ... for delivery or use therein" of alcoholic
beverages. That Amendment, therefore, gives New York only the authority to control
sales of liquor in New York, and confers no authority to control sales in other States. The
Commerce Clause operates with full force whenever one State attempts to regulate the
transportation and sale of alcoholic beverages destined for distribution and consumption
in a foreign country or another State.
Id. at 585.
'6 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
87 Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional
Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 575 (1987) (describing Chief Justice Marshall's ap-
proach in drafting the Gibbons decision).
m Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199-200. Cf Peter C. Felmly, Comment, Beyond the Reach of States: The
Dormant Commerce Clause, Extraterritorial State Regulation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L.
REV. 468, 471-72 (2003) ("Specifically, Marshall opined that states may enact laws so long as
such laws do not contradict or interfere with a validly enacted [c]ongressional statute.").
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1929).
Id. at 252.
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Court would take in broadening the sphere of the nascent federal
government's power.
Mid-nineteenth century development of the dormant Commerce
Clause further defined areas in which the states are permitted to regu-
late, perhaps turning on its head the prevailing wisdom of state su-
premacy in the federal system.91 The Court established a dichotomy
between areas of local and areas of national concern in the antebel-
lum case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens.92 Cooley involved a challenge to
a Pennsylvania statute requiring ships entering the Port of Philadel-
phia to hire a local pilot. The Court rejected Cooley's argument that
Pennsylvania could not enact a valid restriction in the face of federal
statutes and constitutional provisions regulating commerce and navi-
gation. In a ruling that could have conclusively halted the develop-
ment of the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court held that
the mere grant of such a power to Congress, did not imply a prohibition
on the States to exercise the same power; that it is not the mere existence
of such a power, but its exercise by Congress, which may be incompatible
with the exercise of the same power by the States, and that the States may
913legislate in the absence of congressional regulations.
Seventy years after Willson, the Supreme Court again articulated the complementary char-
acter of the balance between federal plenary power and state sovereignty, both granted by the
Constitution itself.
"Various textual provisions of the Constitution assume the States' continued existence
and active participation in the fundamental processes of governance. The limited and
enumerated powers granted to the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of the
National Government, moreover, underscore the vital role reserved to the States by the
constitutional design."
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-27 (1999). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[T]he proposed government cannot be deemed a na-
tional one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the
several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects."); Keith E. Whitting-
ton, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and a Response, 80 N.C. L. REv. 773,
782 (2002) ("A theory of state supremacy was extensively developed in the antebellum period,
but has found few adherents since the Civil War.").
92 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
" Id. at 319. The Court expressed the local versus national dichotomy, and found that the
state interest in ensuring safe passage to ships accessing the Port of Philadelphia, similar to pilo-
tage laws regarding other ports, was sufficient to protect the pilotage requirement. Safe access
to a particular port is a local concern deserving of local regulation, as opposed to those issues of
national commerce for which national legislative attention would be appropriate:
Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many,
but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively de-
manding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States
in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that
diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.
. The act of 1789 contains a clear and authoritative declaration by the first Con-
gress, that Lhe nature of this subject is such, that until Congress should find it necessary
to exert its power, it should be left to the legislation of the States; that it is local and not
national; that it is likely to be the best provided for, not by one system, or plan of regula-
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However, the Court specifically limited its holding to the facts before
it, allowing for future development of the concept of dormancy in the
Commerce Clause.94 Some view this qualifier as effecting a compro-
mise to avoid an explosion of antebellum tensions with states' rights
advocates. 9'
Following the Civil War, the Court took the opportunity to clearly
and unambiguously enunciate the basis of what we understand today
to be the dormant Commerce Clause. In Welton v. Missouri,96 the
Court struck down a protectionist Missouri statute that required a li-
cense of those who sold goods manufactured outside of Missouri, but
waived the license requirement for those selling goods produced
within the state.97 Though not citing to the Cooley decision, the Court
used the local-national dichotomy to ground its decision, holding
that "where the subject to which the power applies is national in its
character, or of such a nature as to admit of uniformity of regulation,
the power is exclusive of all State authority."9 8 The protectionist legis-
lation before the Court in this instance confirmed their fears, and
those of some of the Framers, that without some limit to state sover-
eignty, the republic would devolve into independent commercial en-
tities, battling one another with hostile legislation. Invoking Con-
gress as the peacemaker and superior authority, the Court declared
that "the fact that Congress has not seen fit to prescribe any specific
rules to govern inter-State commerce does not affect the question. Its
inaction on this subject ... is equivalent to a declaration that inter-
State commerce shall be free and untrammelled."9q
As the nation entered the twentieth century, the test employed by
the Court to evaluate dormant Commerce Clause arguments shifted
from the "local-national scheme" to a "formalistic approach designed
tions, but by as many as the legislative discretion of the several States should deem appli-
cable to the local peculiarities of the ports within their limits.
Id.
,4 To avoid an expansive interpretation of its holding in Cooley, the Court stated:
To these precise questions, which are all we are called on to decide, this opinion must be
understood to be confined. It does not extend to the question what other subjects, under
the commercial power, are within the exclusive control of Congress, or may be regulated
by the States in the absence of all congressional legislation; nor to the general question
how far any regulation of a subject by Congress, may be deemed to operate as an exclu-
sion of all legislation by the States upon the same subject.
Id. at 320.
" See, e.g., Redish & Nugent, supra note 87, at 579 ("[Marshall's] approach simultaneously
avoided confrontation with states' rights advocates, yet reserved for the Court the ability to in-
validate objectionable state legislation under a theory of partial exclusivity.") (emphasis in
original).
91 U.S. 275 (1875).
17 Id. at 277-78.
"4 Id. at 280.
Id. at 282.
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to take into account the effects of regulation on interstate com-
merce. ' "  The Court struck state legislation that it found to have a
direct burden on interstate commerce, °1 but upheld those statutes
where it found the burden to be merely indirect or not sufficiently
direct.0 2 But this scheme proved to be lacking, as had its predeces-
sor. The Court moved away from these formulaic approaches around
mid-century, adopting instead a "two-tiered approach that classified
state regulations according to whether they directly discriminated
against out-of-state interests or regulated evenhandedly, but with in-
direct effects on interstate commerce.'0 3  The trajectory of this dis-
crimination analysis, though wavering along the way, leads directly to
the modern conflict between the Commerce Clause, dormant and
otherwise, the Twenty-first Amendment, and state regulations restrict-
ing the interstate commerce of wine and liquor.
II. THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence in the Twenty-first century
has created a tightrope for states to walk when drafting legislation to
exercise their liquor control authority. Vagueness in courts' descrip-
tions of this narrow path of acceptable action has required the Su-
preme Court to step in to establish a clear standard, which should
build up from the foundation laid down in Bacchus and trend towards
greater permissiveness in the interstate trafficking of alcoholic bever-
ages.
A. The Grassroots Campaign
Before examining the in-court developments in this area, it will be
helpful to briefly survey the out-of-court, grassroots campaign that has
arisen in response to this issue. Even the parties to some of the cur-
'0 Felmly, supra note 88, at 473. "This new test analyzed individual cases in terms of whether
a regulation's effect either directly or indirectly impeded the flow of interstate commerce." Id.
See also Redish & Nugent, supra note 87, at 580 ("In Southern Pacic Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,
[325 U.S. 761 (1945),] the Court noted that the states could neither impede the 'free flow' of
commerce nor regulate elements of interstate commerce requiring national uniformity.").
"' See Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927) (striking down a Pennsylvania statute
imposing certain requirements on sellers of passenger steamship tickets as constituting a "direct
burden" on foreign commerce).
2 See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 283 U.S. 380, 397 (1931) (up-
holding a California statute requiring interstate railroad companies "to remove certain grade
crossings and to build a union terminal within a defined area known as the Plaza site in Los An-
geles" as a measure that did "not unnecessarily or arbitrarily trammel or interfere with the op-
eration and conduct of railroad properties and business"); Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U.S.
524, 536-37 (1910) (upholding a Georgia statute requiring railroad engineers to blow their lo-
comotives' whistles as they approached a public road).
,03 Felmly, supra note 88, at 475.
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rent cases exude a certain grassroots flair. Juanita Swedenburg, the
septuagenarian Virginia vineyard owner and plaintiff in one of the
ongoing cases, was the subject of a July 2003 People magazine article
and closed the article with a dramatically populist turn of phrase:
"Someone from Maine who would like to buy a wine from Virginia
should be able to get it. That's what makes America America."' 4
The two camps in this debate are well-organized and based in
relevant trade associations. The California based Wine Institute is
one of the strong voices in favor of unburdened direct shipment.
105
Also on the side of direct shipment is the "Free the Grapes" cam-
paign, a "501c(6) non-profit California trade association whose op-
erations are funded exclusively by contributions from wine consum-
ers and winemakers. 10 6  Besides an amusing graphic of an angry,
shackled grape on its website, Free the Grapes! serves as a clearing-
house for information on this topic and a facilitation point for grass-
roots lobbying. The group's website lists those states, about half of
those in the nation, that continue to prohibit direct shipment of
wine, four of which consider violations of these laws to be felonies,
and provides links by which interested people can contact their state
legislators.
1 7
Beyond these outposts in California wine country, the direct
shipment movement has national representation in Washington, D.C.
under the auspices of WineAmerica: The National Association of
American Wineries. This group represents wineries nationally, in-
cluding many small, family-owned vineyards, and lobbies the govern-
ment on a number of industry-related issues.108
The restrictive state laws also have their supporters; namely, the
wholesale wine industry, much of which is represented by Wine &
Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc. ("WSWA"). WSWA, which re-
cently moved from Washington, D.C. to New York City, represents
I4 Crushing Victory, PEOPLE,July 14, 2003, at 112.
'o' See Wine Institute: The Voice for California Wine, at http://www.wineinstitute.org (last
visited Sept. 22, 2004). The Institute's "Who We Are" page includes this description: "Wine
Institute is the public policy advocacy association of California wineries. Wine Institute brings
together the resources of 782 wineries and affiliated businesses to support legislative and regu-
latory advocacy, international market development, media relations, scientific research, and
education programs that benefit the entire California wine industry." Wine Institute, About Us,
at http://www.wineinstitute.org/who.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
' Free the Grapes!, About Us, at http://www.freethegrapes.org/about-us.html (last visited
Sept. 22, 2004).
,07 Free the Grapes!, Wine Lovers, at http://www.freethegrapes.org/wine-lovers.html (last
visited Sept. 22, 2004).
'0 WineAmerica: The Nat'l Ass'n for Am. Wineries, Mission ("With more than 700 members
from 48 states WineAmerica is the only wine trade association with national membership. This
provides a formidable grass roots lobbying strength used to benefit the entire industry."), at
http://www.americanwineries.org/whoweare/mission.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
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and advocates on behalf of a large segment of the alcohol wholesalers
in the United States. °9 While obviously interested in promoting the
growth and success of the wine and liquor industry, wholesalers, as a
collective, fear that they have much to lose from the expanding legis-
lative trend of allowing direct shipment. Their's is a middleman posi-
tion and direct shipment from vineyard to consumer obviates the
need for that position.
Outside of these trade associations, other experts and interested
parties have also weighed in on these issues. Not surprisingly, nor
without good reason, those in the wine business-rather than the
beverage wholesale industry-have sided with the wineries and oeno-
philes. Notably, "wine guru" Robert M. Parker, Jr., editor and pub-
lisher of Wine Advocate, predicts "the total collapse of the convoluted
three-iered system of wine distribution in the United States" within
ten years."" Further, the government has begun to analyze this issue
from a policy perspective. Recently, the Federal Trade Commission
conducted a study of online wine sales and concluded that, "con-
sumers could reap significant benefits if they had the option of pur-
chasing wine online from out-of-state sources and having it shipped
directly to them." 2 In proposing an approach for future jurispru-
dence of this issue below, I will echo the FTC's recommendations
that "[states] may have less restrictive alternatives that would allow
online competition and, ultimately, provide the greatest benefit to
consumers.... [T]he FTC has strongly encouraged policymakers to
adopt pro-competitive rules in many different industries, including
contact lens sales, casket sales, and real estate and legal services."'
Under the status quo, states feel entitled to adopt restrictive statutes
that stifle the interstate traffic of alcohol.
'0 According to its Web site:
The [WSWA] is the national trade organization representing the wholesale branch of the
wine and spirits industry. It is dedicated to advancing the interest and independence of
wholesale distributors of wine and/or spirits .... Our members distribute more than
90% of all wines and spirits sold at wholesale in the United States.
Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of Am., Inc., About Us, at http://www.wswa.org/public/about/
who.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2004).
"' See Robert M. Parker, Jr., Parker Predicts the Future, FOOD & WINE, Oct. 2004, at 120 ("The
current process, a legacy of Prohibition .... is an absurdly inefficient system that costs the con-
sumer big bucks.").
. FED. TRADE COMM'N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE (July
2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf
(last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
112 E-Commerce: The Case of Online Wine Sales and Direct Shipment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 16
(2003) (statement of Todd Zywicki, Director, Office of Policy Planning, Federal Trade Commis-
sion).
,,3 E-Commerce Study Shows Consumer Benefits of Online Wine Ordering, THE COMPUTER &
INTERNET LAw., Jan., 2004, at 22.
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If ultimately successful, these grassroots campaigns or govern-
ment-directed policy initiatives may render the conflict discussed
herein effectively moot by removing any constitutionally-defective
statutes. However, this cannot be fully accomplished before the
Court rules on this issue in the next year. A growing number of states
have allowed direct shipping in recent years and that number is likely
to increase in the near future, regardless of the outcome of the litiga-
tion discussed below. Nonetheless, when the Court takes up the issue
this term for the first time since Bacchus, it must firmly establish a
clear standard for determining the scope of state laws enacted pursu-
ant to Twenty-first Amendment powers when they come into conflict
with federal constitutional law or statutes to avoid such conflicts in
the future.
B. The Last Bastion of State Power
In a textbook example of judicial hairsplitting, Judge Easterbrook,
the Bacchus plaintiffs' attorney, penned the opinion in Bridenbaugh v.
Freeman-Wilson,114 in which the Seventh Circuit held that regulation of
the mere importation of alcohol was, after Bacchus, the final strong-
hold of state power under the Twenty-first Amendment. Judge
Easterbrook distinguished the invalidated Hawaiian taxation scheme
of Bacchus from the Indiana direct shipment prohibition in Bri-
denbaugh. Indiana law prohibits "direct shipments from out of state
to Indiana consumers by any 'person in the business of selling alco-
holic beverages in another state or country,"' and several Indiana citi-
zens who were interested in receiving such direct shipments brought
suit.115
In rejecting the parties' arguments that the "core concerns" of the
Twenty-first Amendment should govern, Judge Easterbrook declared
that "our guide is the text and history of the Constitution, not the
'purposes' or 'concerns' that may or may not have animated its
drafters. Objective indicators supply the context for Section 2; sup-
positions about mental processes are unilluminating. '" 6 After con-
ducting a brief historical survey of the topic, Judge Easterbrook em-
ployed a logical formulation to determine that states must be able to
prohibit the types of transactions that the Indiana statute in question
prohibits, else "[Section] 2 would be a dead letter."
17
.. 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Bridenbaugh v. Carter, 532 U.S. 1002
(2001).
.. Id. at 849. In an elaboration not directly relevant to the subject of my analysis, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs, who were not themselves out-of-state shippers, had standing to
bring suit. Id. at 849-51.
" Id. at 851.
"' Id. at 853. This logical exercise goes as follows:
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Though the court here upheld the Indiana law, and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari, Bridenbaugh still appears to limit the set of
state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment to those that pro-
mote core concerns and disallow discriminatory schemes. The deci-
sion in Bridenbaugh construes the Indiana statute as narrowly as possi-
ble to avoid conflict with Supreme Court precedent, an option not
open to the Court in the cases it will hear this term. That said, the
small realm of constitutionally permissible state alcohol restrictions
that remain-excluding those directed solely at effecting temper-
ance-still come in conflict with the Commerce Clause and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission's aforementioned recommendations. 18
The Fourth Circuit adopted similar reasoning when it invalidated
a discriminatory portion of North Carolina's Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol ("ABC") laws."19 In a suit brought by both in-state oenophiles and
out-of-state sellers, the court affirmed the North Carolina District
Court's finding that the ABC laws' preference for local wineries
unlawfully discriminated against interstate commerce. 120  However,
rather than throwing the baby out with the bathwater, the court nar-
rowly tailored its opinion, vacating and remanding the case insofar as
the non-discriminatory ABC laws were concerned so that the constitu-
tional defect could be remedied.
12
C. New Direction
True believers in the Young's Market interpretation of Twenty-first
Amendment jurisprudence would likely be horrified at the positions
taken in the recent cases discussed above that preserved the states'
rights merely to regulate liquor traffic. One can only imagine how
they would respond to the more blatant assaults on state regulatory
No longer may the dormant Commerce Clause be read to protect interstate shipments of
liquor from regulation; § 2 speaks directly to these shipments. Indeed, all 'importation'
involves shipments from another state or nation. Every use of § 2 could be called 'dis-
criminatory' in the sense that plaintiffs use that term, because every statute limiting im-
portation leaves intrastate commerce unaffected. If that were the sort of discrimination
that lies outside state power, then § 2 would be a dead letter.
Id. (emphasis added).
1' As the FTC explained:
State bans on interstate direct shipping represent the single largest regulatory barrier to
expanded e-commerce in wine. By allowing interstate direct shipping, states would give
consumers the opportunity to save money on their wine purchases, and would let con-
sumers choose from a much greater variety of wines.
FC REPORT, supra note 111, at 40.
,,9 Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
' , Id. at 519 ("With the elimination of the local preference statute, no interest of the Twenty-
first Amendment is implicated, yet the discrimination violating the Commerce Clause is elimi-
nated.").
121 Id.
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power evinced in the growing line of cases that emphasize the protec-
tion of the Commerce Clause over and in direct conflict with states'
Twenty-first Amendment powers.
In its unchallenged decision striking a Kansas statute barring non-
residents from obtaining alcohol distribution licenses, the Kansas Dis-
trict Court cast the twentieth century's Supreme Court jurisprudence
on this issue in a light seemingly quite different from that cast by the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits. 2 The district court saw the develop-
ment of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Amendment as
leaving Section 2 essentially bereft of any power: "the Supreme
Court... ultimately recognized that the Twenty-first Amendment did
not confer virtually complete control to the states in structuring their
liquor distribution system. 123
Further, with a nod to the Bacchus "core concerns" approach, the
court boldly declared that, "in order to be 'saved' by the Twenty-first
Amendment, the state's exercise of reserved powers must be genu-
inely directed to the goals of temperance and avoidance of the evils
of unregulated trafficking in liquor.' 2 4 Should this standard be en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court, it will likely eradicate virtually all exist-
ing instances where state liquor laws conflict with the Commerce
Clause, as temperance and "avoidance of evils" have fallen by the leg-
islative wayside in favor of economic protectionism and collection of
125
tax revenue.
Heralded upon its decision in November 2002 as the catalyst and
standard-bearer for national change by direct shipment supporters,
such as the Free the Grapes! group, Swedenburg v. Kelly invalidated
New York's complete ban on out-of-state direct shipment, while pre-
serving the state's regulatory regime that allowed in-state wineries to
freely ship their products directly to consumers. 126 New York's alco-
hol control regulations required wineries that wanted to sell directly
to consumers to have licenses and these licenses could only be ob-
tained if the winery "has and maintains a branch factory, office or
storeroom within the state of New York and receives wine in this state
'" Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co. v. State, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Kan. 2001).
'2' Id. at 1245.
, ' Id. at 1246.
'25 While several states have statutes or other codifications allowing counties or other intra-
state governmental units to determine whether they would like to be "wet" or "dry"-e.g., ALA.
CODE § 11-47-112 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 23-901 (Michie 2003); and N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW
§ 2 (2003)-most state liquor control laws merely detail the costs and conditions for industry
participants.
'26 Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir.
2004).
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consigned to a United States government bonded winery, warehouse
or storeroom located within the state."
1 2 7
Rejecting all of defendant's contentions, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, in language that was echoed in the re-
cent FTC report,2 held:
The [c]ourt believes that the important goals of temperance and prohib-
iting the sale of wine to minors can be addressed (in a nondiscriminatory
manner) for out-of-state as well as for in-state wineries (which are cur-
rently able to sell their products over the Internet and to ship directly to
homes in New York State) .
With a wink and a nod to the oft-repeated tacit affirmation of state
power under Section 2 of the Amendment, 130 the court found that the
state's ban on out-of-state direct shipment "is not evenhanded and
constitutes a per se violation of the Commerce Clause."13
This decision was reversed, in relevant part, by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in February 2004.132 The court adopted
the same analytical approach as used by Judge Easterbrook in Bri-
denbaugh, acknowledging that only one other circuit court had em-
ployed it in a similar case.133 The court rested its ruling partly on its
acceptance of the notion that "presence ensures accountability,"
meaning that New York's statutory requirement that licensees must
maintain some physical presence in the state was, in the eyes of the
court, reasonable and sufficient for the Twenty-first Amendment to
save the regulatory scheme from dormant Commerce Clause scru-
tiny.3
Despite this presence requirement, the court "[found] no indica-
tion ... that the regulatory scheme is intended to favor local interests
over out-of-state interests.' 35 Clearly, alcohol is different than other
classes of products merely because of the existence of the Twenty-first
Amendment, but modern Supreme Court jurisprudence and courts
in several other circuits have looked at similar facts and have ruled
that these statutes are unconstitutional.
217 N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAw § 3(37) (2003).
FTC REPORT, supra note 111, at 26-27.
Swedenburg, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 149.
Id. at 146 n.25 ("Again, this is not to say that the entire New York three-tier system is un-
constitutional or that the State does not 'enjoy broad power under § 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment to regulate the importation and use of intoxicating liquor within [its] borders.'")
(quoting Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984)).
131 Id. at 147.
... Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004).
M Id. at 231.
IM Id. at 237.
15 Id. This seems somewhat contrary to logic when the court then stated that "the physical
presence requirement could create substantial dormant Commerce Clause problems if this li-
censing scheme regulated a commodity other than alcohol." Id. at 238.
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Recent developments suggest that direct shipment in New York
will not be just a matter of case law, but statutory law as well. Gover-
nor George Pataki included a direct shipment proposal in his 2004
budget, which "[i]f passed by the Legislature... would allow New
York's more than 160 wineries to ship their wines to consumers in the
13 other states that have reciprocal wine-shipping laws.' 36 Legislative
initiatives such as this one fully embrace the economic and legal reali-
ties of the present-day wine and liquor industry, which has outgrown
local boundaries, and respect producers, and consumers, while hon-
oring the "core concerns" of the Twenty-first Amendment. With the
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Swedenburg,37 it appears that
the legislature and Court will race to decide the fate of direct ship-
ping of wine in New York. Regardless of when and how the New York
state legislature acts, the Supreme Court should reverse the Second
Circuit's decision and reinstate the ruling by the Southern District of
New York that struck the importation ban.
Advocates of less restricted interstate commerce saw the ball start
rolling in their favor with the Swedenburg decision at the district court
level, and others followed soon after. In 2003, there were two major
circuit decisions in favor of less burdensome direct shipment laws. In
the Fifth Circuit, Dickerson v. Bailey13 struck down Texas's restrictions
that allowed in-state sellers to ship directly to consumers, in avoid-
ance of the three-tier distribution system, while requiring that out-of-
state direct shippers subject themselves to that system. Holding that
"Texas's economically discriminatory regulations against out-of-state
wineries clearly violate the 'substantial equality' in fundamental rights
that is secured, under the Constitution, to all citizens of different
states," the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, like the Southern
District of New York, paved the way for the invalidation of any state
statute that treated more harshly alcohol im porters shipping to con-
sumers than it did domestic direct-shippers.
Two months after the Fifth Circuit's Texas ruling, the Sixth Cir-
cuit, relying on Dickerson and criticizing Bridenbaugh, reversed the dis-
trict court and invalidated Michigan's prohibition on out-of-state di-
" Alan J. Wax, State Foresees $3M Yearly in Wine Bill, NEWSDAY (New York), Jan. 23, 2004, at
A47.
" 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No. 03-
1274, consolidated with Nos. 03-116 and 03-1120).
336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 403 n.67 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)). The court also dis-
cussed the conflict between economic protectionism of the sort employed by the Texas statutes
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1,
holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause act together "'to
place the citizens of each State upon the same footing as citizens of other States.'" 336 F.3d at
403 n.67 (quoting Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978)).
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rect shipment.' 40  The Michigan law was virtually identical to the
Texas statute struck down in Dickerson and invalidated in Beskind v.
Easley,14' helping to cement one of the common threads in these deci-
sions-in order to survive a Commerce Clause challenge, a state al-
cohol regulation must "fall[] within the core of the State's power un-
der the Twenty-first Amendment, having been enacted 'in the
interest of promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market condi-
tions, and raising revenue,' and... these interests 'cannot be ade-
quately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."1 42 This
standard, crafted from earlier Supreme Court decisions, will serve as
a powerful tool by those seeking to invalidate other states' direct
shipment prohibitions.
III. WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?
A. Action in the Court
After failing to secure a rehearing before the Sixth Circuit,
43
Michigan, and its Beer and Wine Wholesalers Association, each peti-
tioned the Supreme Court in January 2004 to hear its appeal. 44 Addi-
tionally, the Swedenburg plaintiffs petitioned the Court to overturn the
Second Circuit's decision, which conflicts with the Sixth Circuit's de-
cision in Heald.'45  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and con-
solidated these cases on May 24, 2004. Parties to the consolidated
"' The court stated:
Bridenbaugh is the sole federal court of appeals decision to find that analogous direct
shipment laws are constitutional under the Twenty-first Amendment. However, Bri-
denbaugh is distinguishable on its facts, and it has been criticized by several federal courts
for its failure to engage in the requisite dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 526 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 24,
2004) (No. 03-1116, consolidated with Nos. 03-1120 and 03-1274).
,' 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003).
'4 Heald, 342 F.3d at 525-26 (citations omitted).
,4' Heald v. Engler, No. 01-2720, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23001, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2003)
(concluding "that the issues raised in the petitions were fully considered" in the original case).
14 Granholm v. Heald, 72 U.S.L.W. 3507 (U.S. Jan. 30, 2004) (No. 03-1116) (emphasizing
the "substantial conflict among the federal circuits in [interpreting] state rights to regulate the
importation of alcoholic beverages under the 21st Amendment" in the face of Commerce
Clause challenges); Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Heald, 72 U.S.L.W. 3507 (U.S.
Feb. 2, 2004) (No. 03-1120) (challenging the Sixth Circuit's invalidation of Michigan's prohibi-
tion on importation statute).
115 SeeJerry Hirsch, Ruling Hits State Wine Shippers, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at C2 ("However,
the ruling was in conflict with other appeals court decisions in similar suits in other states, set-
ting up a battle that legal experts say could be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court."); Anthony
Lin, Panel Upholds Ban on Direct Wine Shipment, N.Y. L. J., Feb. 17, 2004, at 1 ("A ruling by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upholding a New York state ban on the direct
shipment of out-of-state wines to residents has 'teed up the issue for the U.S. Supreme Court,'
according to the lawyer leading the charge against such bans.").
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cases will present oral arguments on this single question: "Does a
State's regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to
ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability of out-of-state win-
eries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of [Sec-
tion] 2 of the 21st Amendment?'
46
The most recent articulation of a standard, the Sixth Circuit's
above-quoted reasoning in Heald,147 is a proper starting point for the
Court to use when drafting its opinion. It is grounded on previous
Supreme Court decisions and, in application, minimizes the negative
effects that many state ABC laws have had on free trade. As stated in
the introduction to this Comment, the Court should survey the pre-
sent landscape of commerce, acknowledging the important role that
the Internet plays and will continue to play in promoting competition
in ways that were not previously feasible. 1 4  When crafting its clear
standard, the Court should look in the direction of its own precedent
and that suggested by the FTC, 149 state governments,'°5 0 and public
opinion, as well as several courts of appeals. While it would be in-
'4 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 24, 2004).
141 Heald, 342 F.3d at 525-26. The state alcohol regulations must, "'fall[] within the core of
the State's power under the Twenty-first Amendment,' having been enacted 'in the interest of
promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue,' and because
these interests 'cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.'" Id.
(citations omitted).
148 This is not to say that the Internet renders all existing law moot, but rather that in certain
areas, such as nationwide or international commerce, the ubiquity of the Internet has changed
the playing field in ways that must not be ignored.
149 See FTC REPORT, supra note 111 (advocating that states revise their laws to promote
greater free trade in alcohol via e-commerce).
' More than half of the states in the union now allow direct shipping. Free the Grapes!,
Wine Lovers, supra note 107.
'5' See, e.g., Interstate Wine Sales, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2004, at A18 ("These laws violate the Con-
stitution by discriminating against interstate commerce. They also hurt consumers by keeping
prices artificially high and limiting their choices. The [C]ourt should rule for the retailers and
the consumers challenging these laws."); Kate Riley, Courts Shouldn't Bottle Up Washington's Wines,
SEATtLE TIMES, May 31, 2004, at B6 ("The Supreme Court should lift this ridiculous limitation
on free trade among the states."); David Shaw, The Wine Shipping News, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2004,
at F6 ("I hope the [C]ourt throws all those states' laws out the window. I hope the [Jiustices
rule that wineries in California and elsewhere can ship their wines directly to consumers in
every one of the 50 states."); Widen Wine Sales, NEWSDAY (New York), June 5, 2004, atA19 ("The
shipment bans are protectionism at the expense of consumers and small vineyards, and the
[C] ourt should not permit that."). But see Steven Chapman, Weighing a Case of Wine, CHI. TRIB.,
June 1, 2004, at 11 ("The [C]ourt may be tempted to decide that, in our modern economy, the
freedom of buyers and sellers to transact business across state lines ought to trump other con-
cerns. But it should resist the urge.").
152 See Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 403 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Texas's economically discrimi-
natory regulations against out-of-state wineries clearly violate the 'substantial equality' in fun-
damental rights that is secured, under the Constitution, to all citizens of different states.");
Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 24,
2004) (No. 03-1116, consolidated with Nos. 03-1120 and 03-1274) ("The central purpose of the
21st Amendment is not to empower states to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to
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correct to say that interpretation of the law should simply accede to
public opinion, in this case the Court would merely be clarifying and
reaffirming its previous statements on this issue, which happen to
align with the popular and political trends. In crafting its decision,
the Court must step in to remedy the deficiency it noted in Midcal'
"there is no bright line between federal and state powers over liq-
uor." 113 Consumers and winery owners, particularly low-volume pro-
ducers, will continue to be harmed by discriminatory restrictive stat-
utes until the Court clearly settles the issue of where that line lies.
B. How the States Can React
After the Supreme Court speaks decisively on this issue, many
states will need to revise their laws, some to conform with the greater
sphere of free trade that the Court should allow and some to recap-
ture basic state powers given under the Twenty-first Amendment that
have subsequently been lost or diminished. To that end, I recom-
mend that all states statutorily allow direct shipment of wine and liq-
uor from out-of-state distributors. Clearly, those states who seek to
promote temperance within their borders are free to legislate accrd-
ingly, as this is a core concern of and basic right granted them by Sec-
tion 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. States can continue to pro-
hibit the sale or production of alcohol in areas of or throughout their
entire state, as some do now.154
Further, the states need some way to maintain orderly market
conditions and raise revenue, the other core concerns. To establish a
system to do this that neither burdens interstate commerce nor
harms the interests of consumers, states should charge their Liquor
Control Boards, or equivalent agencies, with supervising the traffic of
all alcoholic beverages shipped directly to their residents. By employ-
ing a single access point for all directly-shipped alcohol, states would
be able to tax these products equally without impermissibly discrimi-
nating against out-of-state producers. This scheme could perhaps ac-
count and adjust in some way for existing taxes on domestic produc-
ers so that they are not unfairly burdened, but, of course, all
producers would be taxed by their home states so this adjustment
would likely be minimal to avoid disparate treatment. In addition to
competition.") (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272)(1984)); Beskind v. Eas-
ley, 325 F.3d 506, 517 (4th Cir. 2003) ("North Carolina's regulatory preference of in-state wine
manufacturers... discriminates against out-of-state wine manufacturers and sellers, in violation
of the dormant Commerce Clause, and... the preference is 'not supported by any clear con-
cern of the Twenty-first Amendment,' and therefore is not saved by the Twenty-first Amend-
ment.") (citing Bacchus, 468 U.S. 263 at 276).
15, Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980).
' 5 See state statutes cited supra note 125.
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avoiding unconstitutionally discriminatory distribution systems, this
single access point model would allow states to police against the traf-
fic of alcohol to minors, which the FTC reported has been success-
fully accomplished in states currently allowing direct shipment. 55
This system would also provide for the type of accountability high-
lighted in the Second Circuit's decision in Swedenburg,156 without the
onerous physical presence requirement that New York and other
states currently mandate.
While states may argue that this model closely resembles the exist-
ing scheme of three-tiered wholesale distribution, 157 the greater free-
dom of direct shipment envisioned herein would prevent the devel-
opment of the economic forces that keep smaller producers off the
shelves of most wholesalers.'5  Wholesalers are not as interested in
stocking high-end wine from boutique vineyards because wholesalers
do not operate on single bottle or single case economies. Direct
shipping can and the single access point model recommended here
would allow these small producers to ship their products to interested
consumers, while still allowing states to properly satisfy their legiti-
mate interests, as would be expressed in the ideal Supreme Court
opinion on this issue.
CONCLUSION
As some states continue to battle the Commerce Clause in federal
court with the sword provided to them by Section 2 of the Twenty-
first Amendment, the Supreme Court must establish a clear standard,
unambiguously drawing the line between these competing interests.
There exists language in the Court's own decisions, as well as those of
the Courts of Appeals that can provide a strong foundation for the
"I See FTC REPORT, supra note 111, at 26-27 ("In practice, many states have decided that they
can prevent direct shipping to minors through less restrictive means than a complete ban, such
as by requiring an adult signature at the point of delivery. These states generally report few, if
any, problems with direct shipping to minors.").
' See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that "[p]resence
ensures accountability" and providing some examples of how this may be true).
' "The most common form of regulation is the 'three-tiered' system, in which producers of
alcohol cannot sell their products directly to consumers. They must sell their products to li-
censed wholesalers, which in turn must sell to licensed retailers, which sell to the consumer."
Lloyd C. Anderson, Direct Shipment of Wine, the Commerce Clause and the Twentyfirst Amendment: A
Call for Legislative Reform, 37 AKRON L. REv. 1, 3 (2004). For more background on the three-
tiered system, see Douglass, supra note 30, at 1621-22 ("States justified the three-tiered distribu-
tion system as a way to prevent organized crime-which had run illegal liquor empires during
Prohibition-from dominating the legalized liquor industry.").
' I do not discuss the effect that this debate and its outcome may have on retailers because
they have not played a major part in this litigation and they are less likely to be affected by the
possible outcomes because they are not a mandated component of current regulatory schemes
and direct shipping would only constitute a small minority of total sales.
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standard to be enunciated. Accounting for the current realities of in-
terstate commerce, the Court should endorse the limited reading of
state power under the Twenty-first Amendment found in Dickerson
and Heald, limiting legitimate state statutes to the realm of the core
concerns: temperance, maintenance of orderly market conditions,
and raising revenue.
States should embrace the model set out above, which would ad-
dress many of their expressed concerns and embodies the legitimate
motivations behind the statutes that have been or will be invalidated.
Consumers and alcoholic beverage producers will also benefit from
increased competition and accessibility, while staying within the in-
tended bounds of the law.
